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1. The Deep Continuity Thesis 
 
One of the many ground-breaking themes in Evan Thompson’s rich and thought-
provoking book Mind in Life: Biology, Phenomenology, and the Sciences of Mind  is 
his distinctive development and defence of an idea that he calls the deep 
continuity of life and mind – henceforth just deep continuity. Thompson introduces 
this idea as follows: “life and mind share a set of basic organizational principles, 
and the organizational properties distinctive of mind are an enriched version of 
those fundamental to life. Mind is life-like and life is mind-like” (p.128).1 In this 
initial characterization, deep continuity is (as Thompson notes) tantamount to 
what others (e.g. Godfrey-Smith 1994, Wheeler 1997) have called the strong 
continuity thesis of life and mind.2 Thompson claims, however, that these other 
theorists, in concentrating on organizational, functional or behavioural 
properties, have ignored a crucial aspect of life-mind continuity, namely its 
phenomenological dimension. The corrective, then, which recruits an insight that 
Thompson traces back to the work of Hans Jonas (1966), is to recognize that 
“certain basic concepts needed to understand human experience turn out to be 
applicable to life itself” (p.129). Such concepts (more on which below) include 
needful freedom, self-transcendence, and immanent purposiveness. In other 
words, “certain existential structures of human life are an enriched version of 
those constitutive of all life” (p.157).         
 
In what follows I shall offer an all-to-brief response to Thompson’s account of 
deep continuity. The bulk of the paper will be devoted to a critical analysis of the 
key elements out of which Thompson constructs his account, an analysis during 
which I highlight and discuss a number of internal problems and unresolved 
issues for the view. That done, I shall argue that Thompson’s specification of the 
                                                 
1 Unless otherwise indicated, all page numbers refer to Thompson 2007. 
2 For example, Godfrey-Smith (1994, p.83) characterizes strong continuity as the view that “[life] 
and mind have a common abstract pattern or set of basic organizational principles… Mind is 
literally life-like”.   
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relationship between autopoiesis, cognition and life has the unpalatable effect of 
closing off what is arguably the most plausible form of deep continuity. I shall 
end by sketching (but no more than sketching) the thought that the most 
plausible form of deep continuity may yet be established within the kind of 
generic conceptual framework to which Thompson doesn’t exactly warm, a 
framework, that is, which holds that the fundamental structures of life and mind 
are to be understood in terms of notions such as information and representation. 
 
2. Autonomy and Cognition  
 
What is the precise content of Thompson’s deep continuity thesis? To make 
progress on this question, we need to reflect on various theoretical concepts that 
Thompson deploys as he explicates his version of the so-called enactive approach 
to life and mind. For the most part, these concepts are drawn (sometimes in a 
revised form) from the theory of autopoiesis – that powerful, but difficult to 
unravel, web of ideas concerning life and mind on which Thompson’s enactivism 
is built.3 
  
Perhaps the place to begin is with the least specialized of the concepts at work, 
namely that of self-organization. A self-organizing system is one in which certain 
intrasystemic components, on the basis of purely local rules (i.e. without the 
direction of some global executive control process), interact with each other in 
nonlinear ways so as to produce the emergence and maintenance of structured 
global order. Self-organization is now recognized as being a widespread 
phenomenon. Regularly cited examples in the literature include the Beloussov-
Zhabotinsky chemical reaction, lasers, slime moulds, foraging by ants, and 
flocking behaviour in creatures such as birds. Now, although self-organization is 
commonplace, only some self-organizing systems are what Thompson (following 
Varela) calls autonomous. For a self-organizing system also to be an autonomous 
system, the constituent processes of that system must “(i) recursively depend on 
each other for their generation and their realization as a network, (ii) constitute 
the system as a unity in whatever domain they exist, and (iii) determine a 
domain of possible interactions with the environment” (p.44; citing Varela 1979, 
p.55).  Put slightly differently, an autonomous system is a network of 
interdependent processes whose recurrent activity (a) produces and maintains 
                                                 
3 See, especially, chapter 5 of Mind in Life. For the canonical presentation of autopoietic theory, see 
Maturana and Varela 1980. For other autopoiesis-based statements of the enactive approach, see 
e.g. Varela et al. 1991, di Paolo 2005. 
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the very boundary that determines the identity of that network as a unitary 
system (such that what counts as inside the system and what counts as outside 
the system co-emerge as functions of that endogenous activity), and concurrently 
(b) defines the ways in which that system may encounter perturbations from 
what is outside it while maintaining its organization and thus its viability, that is, 
while not disintegrating. Where successive environmentally induced 
perturbations to the autonomous system trigger only states changes that remain 
within that system’s bounds of viability (such that organization is not lost), 
phenomena (a) and (b) together produce a history of structural coupling between 
that autonomous system and its environment. 
 
Enaction is the process by which significance or relevance is brought forth 
through structural coupling. The core idea here is that the process of 
autonomous organization, in establishing the distinction between the self-
maintenance and the collapse of system as a unity, institutes a norm of survival, 
and thereby the significance or relevance of certain environmental perturbations 
as either leaving the system organizationally intact or resulting in its 
disintegration. However, the bare norm of survival to which I have just given 
expression generates only an impoverished kind of significance, because it is 
based on no more than the robustness or conservation of systemic organization 
in the face of environmental perturbation. The system either survives any 
perturbations it experiences, or it doesn’t. As Di Paolo (2005) usefully puts it, the 
norm of survival in play so far is an all-or-nothing affair. What seems clear, 
however, is that domains of significance enacted on the basis of structural 
coupling are regularly more complex in nature, in that they are places “of 
valence, of attraction and repulsion, approach or escape” (p.158). To illustrate 
this with the kind of example that Thompson himself often uses (e.g. p.158), 
bacteria swim towards the area containing the greatest concentration of glucose 
molecules. Thus, as a consequence of the specific metabolically realized 
autonomy of the bacteria, glucose emerges as – is brought forth as – significant 
for those organisms as food. The normative structure enacted here is not an all-or-
nothing affair, but rather a gradient of better or worse outcomes for the 
autonomous system. Navigating this gradient requires the system to be able to 
alter its behaviour in response to changes in its environment, so as to exhibit a 
sensitivity to differences between states. In some way (perhaps implicitly), the 
system monitors how it is doing with respect to maintaining its viability, and 
thus regulates its behaviour accordingly, in order to improve its situation. In 
other words, the autonomous system is now also an adaptive system. The 
enactive process of generating graded significance on the basis of adaptive 
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autonomy is what Thompson, following others (e.g. Varela 1991, Di Paolo 2005), 
calls sense-making.  
 
The next idea from Thompson’s conceptual toolkit that we need in order to carry 
out our analysis of deep continuity is the aforementioned notion of autopoiesis 
(Maturana and Varela 1980). Put crudely, autopoiesis is autonomy plus 
materiality. More specifically, to be autopoietic, an autonomous system must, 
through its own endogenous self-organizing dynamics, produce and maintain a 
material (or physical) boundary which distinguishes that system as a material (or 
physical) unity in the space in which it exists. The paradigm example of an 
autopoietic system is the single living cell, understood as a network of chemical 
reactions that produces its own membrane. The autopoietic organization of the 
living cell is, as Thompson describes it, “autonomy in the biochemical domain” 
(p.44). The precise relationship between autopoiesis and autonomy will concern 
us later, but one thing is worth noting immediately: autopoiesis is sufficient for 
autonomy.4   
 
So now, what does all this tell us about life, mind, and the relationship between 
them? Let’s begin with the notion of cognition. Thompson explicitly defines 
cognition as sense-making. Thus he says “cognition, in the present context, 
means the activity of sense-making” (p.159). Given that autonomy and 
adaptivity are individually necessary and jointly sufficient for sense-making (see 
above), the identification of cognition with sense-making makes autonomy and 
adaptivity individually necessary and jointly sufficient for cognition. However, 
we need to know how to interpret the phrase “in the present context”. 
Thompson’s text strongly suggests that this qualification is there to highlight the 
fact that we are concerned, in the first instance, with cognition “in its minimal 
biological form” (p.159), where the minimal biological form of cognition is the 
first (simplest, most basic) instance of an enacted domain of graded significance 
in nature. Thus Thompson directs our attention towards what he calls “the 
natural roots of intentionality”, where what is at stake is an “analogue of the 
phenomenological notion of the disclosure of the world”, understood as activity 
that brings forth a domain of graded significance on the model of our glucose-
sensitive adaptive bacteria (p.159).   
 
                                                 
4 Although this accurately reflects the way Thompson introduces the term ‘autopoiesis’, he later 
gravitates toward using it in a ‘wide’ sense, so as to include adaptivity (e.g. p.158). It will suit my 
purposes to retain the narrower usage, and that’s what should be assumed in the discussion that 
follows.  
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In spite of this drive towards the minimal and the basic, one shouldn’t be 
tempted to think that anything less than sense-making through adaptive 
autonomy will be adequate for genuine cognition. As Thompson puts it: 
 
Cognition is behavior or conduct in relation to meaning and norms 
that the system itself enacts or brings forth on the basis of its 
autonomy. We have seen that sense-making requires more than 
minimal autopoiesis: it requires autopoiesis enhanced with a capacity 
for adaptivity… [A]utopoiesis plus adaptivity entails sense-making, 
which is cognition in its minimal biological form. (p.159) 
 
The attentive reader will no doubt have noticed that Thompson here talks of 
enhancing minimal autopoiesis rather than, as one might have expected from the 
momentum of my exposition, enhancing minimal autonomy. If we are concerned 
with the sufficient conditions for cognition, this is not an overly significant 
variation. As we have seen already, autopoiesis is sufficient for autonomy, so 
autopoiesis plus adaptivity will be sufficient for sense-making and thus for 
cognition in its minimal biological form. And it is “on the basis of its autonomy” 
that an autopoietic system of the right kind (i.e. one whose autonomy is adaptive 
in form) is able to generate cognitive activity. However, if we are concerned with 
the necessary conditions for cognition, Thompson’s use of the term ‘autopoietic’ at 
a point where we might have expected him to use ‘autonomous’ immediately 
raises the question of whether there could be a nonautopoietic autonomous 
system. In other words, it raise the question of whether, for Thompson, 
autopoiesis is necessary for autonomy. 
 
It might seem that Thompson’s answer to this question is blindingly obvious. 
Indeed, he states that to “qualify as autonomous… a system does not have to be 
autopoietic in the strict sense (a self-producing bounded molecular system)” 
(p.44) and that “there can be autonomous systems that are not autopoietic if their 
constituent processes exhibit organizational closure in their domain of 
operation” (pp.106-7). We can understand these statements better if we consider 
the examples Thompson gives of autonomous systems, which, alongside the 
living cell, include the immune system (p.49, p65), the nervous system (pp.46-7, 
p.65), insect colonies (p.44, p.65) and animal societies (p.65). As we have seen, the 
living cell is an autopoietic system, but, as Thompson points out, these other 
autonomous systems are not. In each case the categorization of the system as 
autopoietic or not turns on the nature of (a) the relevant system-nonsystem 
boundary and (b) the domain in which the system in question exists, as a 
network of constituent processes that generates a unity. For the living cell, the 
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system-nonsystem boundary (the cell membrane) and the domain of existence 
(the biochemical) are material. This specific kind of dual materiality is 
definitional of autopoiesis. We can contrast this with, for example, the nervous 
system and insect colonies. For the nervous system, the fundamental logic of 
which is to couple sensing and movement, the relevant system-nonsystem 
boundary and the domain of existence are fixed at the level of behaviour and 
intentional action (p.49); and for insect colonies the system-nonsystem boundary 
and the domain of existence are fixed at the level of sociality and territoriality 
(p.44). The issue, then, seems to be cut and dried: Thompson’s view is that 
autopoiesis is not necessary for autonomy. 
 
There is, however, an exegetical snag. There are passages in Mind in Life which 
strongly suggest that the interpretation just given must be wrong, and that, for 
Thompson, autopoiesis is necessary for autonomy. Consider, for example, the 
following sequence of claims: 
 
Agency and meaning require autonomy; minimal agency and 
meaning require minimal autonomy. Minimal autonomy depends on 
macromolecules but requires that those macromolecules be organized 
in a particular way, namely, in the autopoietic way. (p.160) 
 
It is hard to read this passage without taking away the message that 
autopoiesis is necessary for autonomy. If autonomy, agency and meaning 
in their minimal forms require autopoiesis, then the most natural thought is 
that all forms of agency, meaning and autonomy do. After all, ‘necessary 
for the minimal form of X’ sounds achingly close to ‘minimally necessary 
for X’. What breeds confidence that we must put any such thought aside 
as an interpretation of Thompson is that it clashes unhelpfully with his claim 
that the immune system, the nervous system, insect colonies and animal 
societies are autonomous systems. Recall the dual materiality of self-
generated systemic boundary and domain of existence that, as we have 
seen, is definitional of autopoiesis. If autopoiesis is indeed necessary for 
autonomy, then the systems currently under consideration, by virtue of 
the natures of their self-generated systemic boundaries and domains of 
existence (see above), would not count as autonomous. The most 
prominent difficulty would then be that, if autonomy is necessary for 
sense-making and thus for cognition, the nervous system (no longer an 
autonomous system) could not be a basis for cognition. And that really 
would upset the applecart.  
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In the preceding paragraphs, I have suggested that there is an inconsistency in 
Thompson’s treatment of the relationship between autopoiesis and autonomy, 
but that we can be confident that he would resolve that inconsistency in a 
particular way. Nevertheless, we should pause for a moment to wonder whether 
there is an alternative reading of the anomalous passage that would avoid 
plunging him into the difficulty first place. So let’s try something out. If we 
unpack ‘minimal’ as ‘minimal biological form of’, in line with Thompson’s 
analysis of cognition (see above), we might interpret him as holding that 
although the minimal biological form of autonomy, and thus the minimal 
biological forms of agency and meaning, require autopoiesis, more advanced 
forms of autonomy, agency and meaning are able to divest themselves of any 
such dependence.  
 
Attributing this view to Thompson would avoid the troublesome inconsistency 
with which we are presently concerned (and, incidentally, explain why he is 
comfortable substituting ‘autopoiesis’ for ‘autonomy’ when characterizing 
cognition in its minimal biological form – see earlier discussion). That said, it 
would saddle him with a new burden, by focussing critical attention on the 
contribution made by the materiality requirements that distinguish autopoiesis 
as a phenomenon over and above autonomy. In identifying autopoiesis as 
necessary for minimal autonomy, Thompson’s goal is to reveal “the ground from 
which the seeds of intentional action grow” (pp.160-1). But the only thing that 
autopoiesis adds to the concept of autonomy is the dual materiality of the 
systemic boundary and the systemic domain of existence. And it is genuinely 
hard to see what special substantive contribution is made to our explanation of 
the genesis of intentional action by recognizing that the minimal biological form 
of autonomy exhibits such dual materiality, given that such materiality is 
apparently expendable by the time that biology gets as far as a nervous system. 
After all, although the distinctive kind of materiality that autopoiesis signals is 
an interesting and important feature of the cell, the idea of minimal autonomy 
already provides for a self-producing unity capable of instantiating a history of 
structural coupling, and it is an enrichment of that very capacity for structural 
coupling, through the addition of adaptivity, that accounts finally for sense-
making and thus for cognition. So the dual materiality of the systemic boundary 
and the domain of existence is not required for the realization of these 
phenomena.  
 
In response to the preceding analysis it might be suggested that although the 
boundary and domain of existence of the autonomous system in question need 
not be material in the relevant sense, nevertheless there must be autopoietic 
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materiality somehow at the centre of any system that genuinely has its own 
perspective on the world.5 Of course, some account would need to be given of 
what ‘at the centre’ means here, but in any case I think the considerations that 
figured in the original analysis are very likely to continue to apply. Consider: As 
it happens, biological cells are not merely autonomous, they are autopoietic. But 
let’s imagine that the physical building blocks of organisms were somehow 
autonomous but not autopoietic. Given that autonomy is sufficient to establish a 
self-producing unity, and that adaptiveness is a modulation of that organization, 
it seems that despite this assumed lack of any autopoietic dimension at the centre 
of things, cognition and intentionality would still enjoy an impeccable 
naturalistic grounding.   
 
3. Autopoiesis and Life          
 
After some clarificationary discussion, we now have a grip on Thompson’s view 
of cognition: cognition is sense-making and so requires adaptive autonomy but 
not autopoiesis. Now, what about life? Thompson’s striking claim is that life is 
autopoiesis plus cognition (p.158). Since cognition is sense-making as established 
by adaptive autonomy, this is formally equivalent to claiming that life is 
adaptive autopoiesis (adaptive autonomy in the biochemical domain). 
Thompson’s development of this view of life is complicated, but in the present 
context we can concentrate on two things – the neo-Kantian role played by 
autopoiesis and the neo-Jonasian role played by the combination of needful 
freedom and self-transcendence.   
 
Thompson uses the concepts of self-organization and autopoiesis to give a 
contemporary reinterpretation of Kant’s (1790) claim that organisms are natural 
purposes (pp.129-49). In brief, the picture is that organisms, like artefacts, are 
systems in which each component exists for the sake of the others in the context 
of the organized whole, in such a way that the cause-effect relations that 
characterize the workings of the system are also means-end relations. That means 
that teleological (purposive) language is needed to characterize the system. 
However, whereas in the case of artefacts the purposiveness in question is 
extrinsic (e.g., established by the pre-existing plan of a human designer), in the 
case of organisms the purposiveness is intrinsic or, as Thompson prefers to say, 
immanent. A property is immanent if it is neither a “nonrelational [and so 
unanalysable, see p.146] property of something internal to the system… nor a 
                                                 
5 Something like this thought seems to be suggested by Di Paolo’s (2005) claim that autopoiesis 
“provides a self-distinct physical system that can be at the centre of a perspective on the world”. 
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property determined by something outside the system… [but rather] a 
constitutive property the whole system possesses because of the way the system 
is organized” (p.146). The puposiveness of an organism is necessarily immanent 
because the means-ends relations that characterize its parts are established by the 
distinctive self-organizing and self-producing activity of the system according to 
which “each of its parts is both a product and a producer of the other parts, so 
that the system is a self-organizing whole” (pp.145-6). And Thompson takes it 
that if organisms were recognized to be autopoietic in nature, that would be 
sufficient to explain their distinctive self-organizing and self-producing character 
and thus the immanence of their purposiveness (p.146).  
 
What are we to make of Thompson’s account of immanent purposiveness? It is 
worth just noting that there is a dispute to be settled here over whether or not 
any multicellular organism is itself strictly autopoietic, as opposed to being built 
out of autopoietic elements (see pp.105-7 for discussion). Fortunately, however, 
having noted this issue, we can simply ignore it, since it seems open to 
Thompson to hold that even if multicellular organisms are not themselves strictly 
autopoietic, the immanent purposiveness of any multicellular organism may be 
inherited from the cells that together make it up, given that each of those cells 
will be an autopoietic system and thus will individually realize immanent 
purposiveness. So let’s agree that Thompson can make good on the claim that 
autopoiesis is sufficient for immanent purposiveness. A further question 
immediately suggests itself: for Thompson, is autopoiesis necessary for 
immanent purposiveness? To answer this question we need to dig just below the 
surface of the text. During his summary of di Paolo’s (2005) argument that sense-
making requires adaptivity (see above), Thompson notes that, for di Paolo, 
“[a]daptivity needs to be established on the basis of autopoiesis; otherwise sense-
making is not original to the system but merely attributed from the outside” 
(p.148). What drives this claim is the thought that, without the connection to the 
specific self-distinguishing process of autopoiesis, the teleological structures of 
sense-making would not be original to the activity of the system (that is, 
immanent), but would merely be attributable to the system by some external 
observer. The same dependency would presumably hold for the teleology 
appropriate to any bare (all-or-nothing) norm of survival based on conservation 
rather than adaptivity, although of course a minimally autopoietic, and thus 
nonadaptive, system would not be cognitive and so, for Thompson, could not 
count as being alive. If all this is right, then, on di Paolo’s view, autopoiesis is not 
only sufficient for immanent purposiveness, it is necessary too. And given that 
Thompson greets di Paolo’s argument with approval, I take that to be a view 
which Thompson shares.   
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At this point it is tempting to resurrect the kind of worry that I raised earlier in 
connection with the claim that autopoiesis is necessary for the genesis of 
intentionality, and ask exactly why, in addition to the self-maintaining profile of 
autonomy, the dual materiality of autopoiesis is necessary to establish the 
immanence of the relevant teleology. One response that Thompson might 
conceivably pursue here would be that it is the specific kind of materiality 
enshrined in autopoiesis (in which a system-defining material boundary is 
endogenously produced and maintained) that is needed to give content to the 
idea (introduced earlier) that each part of a system displaying immanent 
purposiveness must be both a product and a producer of the other parts. That 
would explain why autopoiesis, and not merely autonomy, is necessary for 
immanent purposiveness and thus for life. So how compelling is the idea that the 
kind of productive interdependence at issue requires autopoietic materiality? 
That depends largely on how the notion of a ‘systemic part’ is to be understood. 
As we have seen, within Thompson’s framework, the domain of existence of an 
autonomous system – the ontological level at which its identity is fixed – need 
not be one of first-order materiality; it might, for example, be a domain of social 
relations rather than biochemistry. Presumably, then, there is a relevant notion of 
a ‘systemic part’ that is fixed at an ontological level other than first-order 
materiality. For example, a part of an animal social system may be fixed with 
respect to a level in a dominance hierarchy. But if this is right, then it is 
significant that Thompson’s approach already contains the idea that the 
constituent processes of an autonomous system “recursively depend on each 
other for their generation and their realization as a network” (see above). For if, 
as seems likely, the constituent processes of a system count as systemic parts, or 
if, as also seems likely, the idea of recursive dependence stretches to systemic 
parts that ontologically speaking aren’t processes (if any such parts there be), 
then it seems the notion of autonomy already gives us a picture in which each 
systemic part is both a product and a producer of the other systemic parts. And 
that is a picture of immanent puposiveness. But if autonomy is sufficient for 
immanent purposiveness, then even though autopoietic systems will exhibit 
immanent purposiveness in virtue of being autonomous systems, autopoiesis is 
not needed for immanent purposiveness.  
 
Whatever problems Thompson faces in carving out a distinctive role for 
autopoiesis in explaining the phenomenon of life, the fundamental structure of 
his own final position is, I think, clear enough: cognition is sense-making, while 
life is autopoiesis plus cognition, which is tantamount to saying that cognition is 
adaptive autonomy, while life is adaptive autopoiesis. However, this structural 
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description of things, although accurate, does not do justice to the full richness of 
the cognitive dimension of life, as Thompson sees it. According to Thompson, 
living systems display the intertwined properties of needful freedom and self-
transcendence. Both spring from the character of metabolism. Although, at any 
particular moment, an organism is realized by a finite collection of material 
elements, the distinctive form of the organism cannot be identified with that 
matter, precisely because metabolism involves a constant turnover of material 
elements. Life as a phenomenon thus exhibits a kind of freedom from material 
constitution, simultaneous with a dependence on, a need for, the material 
exchanges with the environment (roughly, eating and excretion) that metabolism 
encompasses. Self-transcendence emphasizes the fact that such metabolically 
grounded needful freedom may be interpreted in terms of a kind of projective 
organization in which organismic being involves a relentless going beyond of 
current state, a transcending (surpassing) of present self-identity. These 
properties of needful freedom and self-transcendence are explicitly introduced 
by Thompson as analogues of existential structures that may be revealed by a 
phenomenological analysis of conscious human experience. For example, and 
very roughly, according to Heidegger (1927), I confront every concrete situation 
in which I find myself as a range of possibilities for the future realization of some 
pattern of human being, meaning that human being essentially involves a 
projection beyond, a freedom from, and a surpassing of, my current concrete 
state. In this way, then, concepts that, from a phenomenological point of view, 
describe universal structural features of human conscious experience also serve 
to locate certain fundamental properties of any living system.   
 
4. Two Kinds of Deep Continuity 
 
Up to now we have been engaged in a critical exposition of the key conceptual 
elements out of which Thompson constructs his account of deep continuity. Our 
next task is to build on that exercise to ask precisely what deep continuity might 
amount to, for Thompson. There are no doubt many ways in which one might 
pursue these goals. I shall content myself with the following twofold strategy. I 
shall present two different interpretations of deep continuity that (the preceding 
analysis suggests) may be extracted from Mind in Life. Of each of these 
interpretations I shall ask (i) How does it conceive the enrichment process that 
deep continuity involves?, and (ii) Is it consistent with another view that is often 
mentioned alongside enactivism as part of a generic embodied cognition 
perspective, namely the extended cognition hypothesis? Let’s pause momentarily to 
comment on each of these questions.   
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Regarding (i): According to Thompson’s notion of deep continuity, the 
organizational and existential properties distinctive of mind are an enriched 
version of those fundamental to life (see above). One might be forgiven for 
taking this to mean that there are certain noncognitive properties of all living 
entities that, when enriched in specific ways, generate the phenomena of mind 
and cognition, phenomena that are exhibited only by a subset of living things. I 
think that this must be how Godfrey-Smith (1994) understands his own, related 
thesis of strong continuity (again, see above). It is certainly how I have always 
understood the idea (see Wheeler 1997). But, as we shall see, this seemingly 
natural interpretation of the enrichment process at the heart of deep continuity 
cannot be endorsed by Thompson. At root, this parting of the ways is driven by 
the fact that the alternative visions of life-mind continuity that will be placed on 
the table embrace more than one conception of the kind of property that gets 
enriched in the evolutionary and developmental paths that lead from single cells 
to conscious human life. Put crudely, the question is whether or not what gets 
enriched is already mental in character pre-enrichment, so a blunt way to raise the 
right issues here would be to wonder whether it is possible for life and cognition 
to exist separately from each other. In other words, by the lights of some 
particular interpretation of deep continuity, could there be nonliving cognitive 
entities or, conversely, noncognitive living entities? That is how I shall approach 
question (i). 
 
Regarding (ii): According to the extended cognition hypothesis (henceforth ExC), 
there are actual (in this world) cases of intelligent action in which thinking and 
thoughts – more precisely, the material vehicles that realize thinking and 
thoughts – are spatially distributed over brain, body and world, in such a way 
that the external (beyond-the-skin) factors concerned are rightly accorded 
cognitive status. In other words, the physical mechanisms of mind sometimes 
extend beyond the traditional boundaries of skull and skin.6 Although nothing in 
what I’ve just said strictly requires that the external elements in an extended 
cognitive system be technological artefacts (e.g. notebooks that provide external 
information-storage for extended memory systems, handheld computers that 
execute steps in extended reasoning processes), that is the standard way of the 
filling in the picture. Notice that in asking whether or not a particular 
                                                 
6 Clark and Chalmers (1998) provide the canonical statement and defence of ExC. For various 
recent developments and discussions of the view, see Menary 2010. For the dispute so far over 
whether enactivism is consistent with ExC, see, e.g., Clark 2008, Wheeler 2010, the contributions 
to Kiverstein and Clark 2009 (especially Di Paolo 2009 and Thompson and Stapleton 2009), 
Rowlands forthcoming, and Cappuccio and Wheeler forthcoming.     
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interpretation of deep continuity is consistent with ExC, I am not assuming that 
ExC is correct – and thus that any interpretation of deep continuity that is 
inconsistent with that hypothesis must be wrong – only that it is instructive, as a 
way of understanding the character, implications and relative merits of different 
interpretations of deep continuity, to determine which theoretical options those 
interpretations leave open and which they close off.7       
 
The two enactive interpretations of deep continuity that I shall consider here 
endorse the following cluster of claims and inferences.  
 Sense-making requires not only autonomy but also adaptivity; cognition is 
sense-making; so cognition requires not only autonomy but also 
adaptivity.  
 Autopoiesis is sufficient for autonomy.  
 Immanent teleology is necessary for life; autopoiesis is necessary for 
immanent teleology; so autopoiesis is necessary for life.  
 
Assuming this shared theoretical backdrop, let’s first revisit the position that, I 
have suggested, is Thompson’s final view. This view is distinguished by the 
conjunction of two further claims – first, that life is autopoiesis plus cognition, 
and second, that autopoiesis is not necessary for autonomy. So, what is the 
nature of the enrichment process that defines the relevant sense of life-mind 
continuity? Put crudely, on the present view, life is what happens when 
autopoiesis is added to cognition, that is, when adaptive autonomy becomes 
autopoietic autonomy. And what that means is that, far from cognition being an 
enrichment of life, life is an enrichment of cognition. Assuming (as is surely 
natural) that cognition signals a phenomenon that we ought properly to call 
mental, the title of Thompson’s book now takes on its full significance. All living 
systems are (to use an ugly term that Thompson doesn’t) minded. So when 
Thompson deploys notions such as needful freedom and self-transcendence, and 
immanent purposiveness to characterize life, and describes those existential 
                                                 
7 It is sometimes suggested that since, on the enactive view, cognition is relationally defined, it 
makes no sense to speak of cognition being spatially located at all (see e.g. di Paolo 2009; 
Thompson and Stapleton 2009). To put the point bluntly, cognition isn’t extended because it isn’t 
anywhere! This seems to me to be an almighty red herring. There is simply no problem about 
relationally defined phenomena exhibiting spatiality. The thing on which my laptop is sitting 
right now counts as a table only because of relational factors to do with the way in enters into a 
context of human activity, but I have no doubt at all that that table is located in space. Or, if the 
mention of an object makes you suspicious, the bodily movements I’m currently making count as 
typing only because of relational factors to do with the way they enter into a context of human 
activity, but I have no doubt at all that that typing is taking place in space.      
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structures as analogous to their psychological counterparts, the analogous 
character of the relation does not signal any loss of (to coin an even uglier term) 
mindedness. The enrichment that takes place, such that “certain existential 
structures of human life are an enriched version of those constitutive of all life” 
(p.157), is an enrichment within the realm of the mental, and not an enrichment 
that, at some (perhaps indeterminate) point, ushers in the mental. That surely 
runs counter to expectations.     
 
Is this view consistent with ExC? The strict answer, I think, is yes. Cognition is 
sense-making, which is adaptive autonomy, but since autopoiesis is not 
necessary for autonomy, and adaptivity is a modulation of autonomy, there 
could conceivably exist adaptively autonomous, that is cognitive, systems that 
are not themselves alive. Since, for Thompson, life is autopoiesis plus cognition, 
every living system is necessarily itself a cognitive system; but not every 
cognitive system is necessarily itself a living system. Thus there might exist an 
extended adaptively autonomous system – that is, an extended cognitive system – 
that although not itself alive, nevertheless had living elements, such as biological 
cells, among its components. So far so good. Unfortunately, however, if we 
reflect on the teleological structures that would characterize such a system, what 
we uncover is an unappealing – one might even say intolerable – conceptual 
mess. 
 
To warm up our intuitions, let’s begin by imagining an adaptively autonomous 
(i.e., a sense-making) robot with no autopoietic elements. By the lights of 
Thompson’s account, this robot would qualify as an artificial cognitive system. 
However, if autopoiesis is necessary for immanent teleology, then the 
teleological structures applicable to this system must be extrinsic rather than 
immanent. Certainly nothing in Thompson’s account prevents there from being a 
cognitive system characterized by extrinsic teleology. But now let’s consider our 
extended cognitive system. For Thompson, it seems that this system, as a result 
of its hybrid organic-technological nature, must realize a kind of hybrid 
immanent-extrinsic teleology. But it’s genuinely difficult to see how to make 
sense of this idea. One avenue of thought might perhaps be that the extrinsic 
teleology enjoyed by the external technological elements is derived from the 
immanent teleology realized by the organic part of the system. Interestingly, this 
suggestion recalls a point sometimes made in relation to representational content 
by opponents of ExC. The critic argues that the contents carried by putatively 
cognitive extracranial elements are merely derived in character, and are thus 
parasitic on the nonderived content carried by neural states and processes. The 
implication (so the argument goes) is that the real cognition remains resolutely 
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internal. Adams and Aizawa, for example, argue that cognition always “involves 
non-derived representations, representations that mean what they do 
independently of other representational or intentional capacities” (Adams and 
Aizawa 2008, p.31). If the existence of hybrid representational content can be 
worked up into a point against ExC, then the same might be true of the kind of 
hybrid teleology with which we are currently concerned. And that seems to set 
up a potentially disagreeable clash with the thought that cognition as enactive 
sense-making (adaptive autonomy) is consistent with ExC.  
 
It might seem that all is not lost. For at this point in the established content-
centred debate, the advocate of ExC might well argue that, pace Adams and 
Aizawa, a genuinely cognitive trait may feature elements that carry only derived 
content, just so long as those elements are part of an integrated process in which 
there is a contribution from other elements (e.g. neural ones) that carry 
nonderived content. But even if this kind of ExC-friendly maneuver is plausible 
in relation to functionalist-based content realization in extended cognitive 
systems, the parallel move in relation to enactive teleology seems positively 
misconceived. After all, if the relevant teleological structures here are brought 
forth by the adaptive behaviour of the autonomous system as a whole – which is 
surely what the enactivist is disposed to say – the proposed strategy of 
partitioning, in which different kinds of teleology attach to different parts of the 
system, looks to be predicated on something akin to a category mistake. Of 
course, one might tidy up the whole mess here by adopting the view (scouted 
above) that autonomy is sufficient for immanent teleology, since then the 
extended adaptively autonomous cognitive system would realize immanent 
teleology and the problems I have highlighted would go away. But that ‘solution’ 
would come at a high price for Thompson, in that it would place even more 
pressure on the thought that autopoiesis plays an essential role in our 
understanding of life and mind. 
 
In light of the difficulties faced by (what I take to be) Thompson’s own 
considered view of deep continuity, let’s recall the anomalous position on 
autopoiesis and autonomy that, I argued earlier, may be found in the pages of 
Mind in Life, and see if an account of deep continuity based on that position fares 
any better. The anomalous claim was that autopoiesis is necessary, as well as 
sufficient, for autonomy.  If this is right, then since cognition is adaptive 
autonomy, autopoiesis is also necessary for cognition. In effect, this new 
dependency would mean that cognition is adaptive autopoiesis, thus rendering it 
rather peculiar to claim, as Thompson does, that life is autopoiesis plus cognition, 
since all bona fide cognitive systems would already be autopoietic. Indeed, since 
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it now seems that both life and cognition are a matter of adaptive autopoiesis, 
one might as well say that life is identical with cognition. This would mean (i) 
that there are no noncognitive living entities, and thus that any process of 
enrichment must once again take place within the realm of the mental, and (ii) 
that there are no cognitive nonliving entities, and thus, assuming that autopoiesis 
remains a property only of organic cells, that there are no hybrid organic-
technological extended cognitive systems. The first conclusion flies in the face of 
the most natural understanding of life-mind continuity, while the second 
displays an inconsistency between enactivism and ExC.      
 
I have claimed that the natural understanding of deep continuity is that there are 
certain noncognitive properties of living entities that, when enriched in specific 
ways, generate the phenomena of mind and cognition, phenomena that are 
exhibited only by a subset of living things. This is, as we have seen, an 
interpretation of the idea that is closed off to Thompson, who holds that life is, in 
a tangible sense, minded all the way down. One might wonder whether this 
tension ought to matter to Thompson. After all, our most natural ways of 
thinking are sometimes wrong. But it is at least arguable that the more natural 
understanding of deep continuity is also more plausible than Thompson’s 
picture. Indeed, one cannot help thinking that, however much we are told that 
Thompson’s deflationary notion of minimal cognition should not be thought to 
encompass higher-order intentional states of belief or consciousness, and 
however much we are warned to think of needful freedom and self-
transcendence as ‘no more than’ analogues of their existential counterparts in 
conscious human experience, the fact remains that if the language of cognition 
and its existential structures is to have any real theoretical bite in the case of the 
basic phenomena of life, the result is a rather unhelpful dose of something akin 
to panpsychism that doesn’t so much solve the problem of the genesis of mind as 
throw a cloak over the thought that there is a genuine problem to be solved. If 
this is right, then we would be well advised to look for an alternative theoretical 
framework for deep continuity that supports the natural reading. I shall end this 
paper with a brief sketch of just such an alternative.  
 
5. A Broadly Representational Approach to Deep Continuity 
 
First let’s consider one way in which genes might be said to code for (i.e. represent 
in an outcome-directed manner) phenotypic traits during biological development 
(Wheeler and Clark 1999, 2008). The point of departure for this account of genetic 
coding is that the developmental construction of phenotypic form is often to be 
explained by the operation of massively distributed causal systems 
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encompassing genes, nongenetic organismic elements and/or wider 
environmental factors. A much-cited example is sex determination in the 
Mississippi alligator. These creatures lay their eggs in nests of rotting vegetation 
which generate heat in varying quantities. Eggs that develop at lower 
temperatures (within some overall range) end up producing females, whilst 
those that develop at higher temperatures end up producing males. 
Environmental temperature is thus a nongenetic factor, the inclusion of which in 
our explanation is necessary, if we are to account for the details of phenotypic 
form. Now, given this sort of distributed developmental solution, if one thought 
that what it means for a gene (or a complex of genes) to code for a phenotypic 
trait is for that gene (or complex of genes) to fully specify the form of that trait, 
where ‘full specification’ requires that the form of a trait may be predicted purely 
on the basis of what may be known about the genes in question, then the claim 
that genes code for traits during development would be false. In the sort of 
distributed developmental system with which we are concerned, knowing the 
entire sequence of an organism’s DNA will not be sufficient to predict 
phenotypic form. Fortunately, this understanding of genetic coding is far from 
mandatory. After all, in familiar cases of algorithms, programs, instruction-sets, 
and other outcome-coding elements, those states and processes are able to 
perform their outcome-generating functions only given some assumed backdrop 
of other causally active states and processes (e.g. working operating systems) 
that themselves bear some of the responsibility for the exact form of the eventual 
product. Genes may play their coding role in a similar way, that is, by 
functioning within an assumed ecological backdrop of other developmentally 
crucial states and processes extended over genes, nongenetic organismic 
elements and/or wider environmental factors 
 
Of course, in view of this spreading of the explanatory load, one needs to say 
precisely what it is that makes the genetic contribution a distinctively 
representational one. One proposal here (e.g. Wheeler and Clark 1999) is that 
there are architectural features exhibited by the mechanisms of protein synthesis 
that, when  taken together, mandate a broadly representational picture of the 
genetic contribution to development. For example, the mappings from particular 
nucleotide triplets of mRNA (as derived from DNA by transcription) to 
particular amino acids during protein synthesis are famously thought to be 
arbitrary, in the sense (tantamount to a kind of information-driven multiple 
realizability) that the class of equivalent states and processes that could play the 
same functional role in the developmental process in question is fixed by 
informational rather than first-order-physical factors. In addition, the mechanisms 
of protein synthesis involve a functionally distinct (although physically 
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distributed) subsystemic module that implements the process of translation by 
consuming information from the upstream transcription module. The idea, then, 
is that where one finds an architecture with these sorts of features, a 
representational understanding of that architecture will be both appropriate and 
explanatorily powerful.  
 
There is obviously much to be said about the justification for, and the details of, 
this picture.8  For the present, however, what matters is that if something like it is 
right, then we can glimpse deep continuity in its more plausible form. Consider 
the way in which neural states might be said to code for (i.e. represent in an 
outcome-directed manner) behaviour during intelligent perception and action 
(see e.g. Wheeler and Clark 1999, Wheeler 2005). In harmony with the hypothesis 
of extended cognition (see above), the systems that explain perceptually guided 
action-generation will often be massively distributed over brain, body and 
world. For example, as John Haugeland (1995/1998) once noted, one way to 
succeed in driving to San Jose would be to consult a cognitive map of the route, 
that is, to access a stored neural representation that specifies how to get there. An 
alternative method would be to select the correct road, and then follow the signs 
until you arrive. In the second case, the driver’s innards and the road collaborate 
as partners in the successful completion of the activity. Indeed, it is not merely 
that the environment is a cheap and up-to-date source of information (although it 
is that), but that any adequate characterization of the action-generation 
mechanism at work here would plausibly need to count the contribution of the 
road as being similar to that of the neural representation cited in the first 
solution. Thus, as Haugeland (1995/1998, p.235) puts it, “much as an internal 
map or program, learned and stored in memory, would... have to be deemed part 
of an intelligent system that used it to get to San Jose, so... the road should be 
considered integral to [the] ability”.  
 
Where perceptually guided intelligent action displays the sort of distributed 
solution nicely depicted in Haugeland’s example, the neural states and processes 
involved will not fully specify the behavioural outcome. Nevertheless, the 
representational credentials of their contribution (where such credentials are 
warranted) may well be secured by the same kinds of features as were operative 
in the case of biological development (again, see e.g. Wheeler and Clark 1999, 
                                                 
8 Indeed, I myself have argued that once the details of the proposed account are filled in, it turns 
out that, strictly speaking, it is not the molecules of DNA that code in development, but rather 
the downstream nucleotide triplets out of which molecules of mRNA are constructed (Wheeler 
2006). Moreover, I have conceded that Godfrey-Smith (2000) may be right to think that there are 
problems in extending coding talk beyond proteins to phenotypic traits (Wheeler 2006). 
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Wheeler 2005).  Thus neural factors may perform an outcome-directed (action-
oriented) representational contribution within an assumed ecological backdrop 
of other behaviourally relevant states and processes extended over the brain, the 
body and/or the world. And that representational contribution may be 
illuminated precisely as such by architectural properties as arbitrariness and 
information-consuming modularity. The former is in truth little more than the 
kind of information-driven multiple realizability that underwrites broadly 
functionalist theorizing in psychology, while the latter, stripped of too much 
Fodorian baggage (Fodor 1983), figures in a wide range of evolutionarily and 
developmentally sensitive regions of contemporary cognitive science, from 
mainstream evolutionary psychology to evolutionary robotics to developmental 
cognitive neuroscience and beyond (for discussion, see Wheeler and Clark 2008). 
Both are wholly consistent with ExC (again, see Wheeler and Clark 2008).  
 
The picture I have just drawn is incomplete in all sorts of ways. It is, as I have 
said, no more than a sketch. Perhaps the most salient worry in the current 
context is that it exploits a set of interconnected concepts (representation, 
information, function, modularity etc.) of which Thompson is hugely suspicious 
and largely critical (see e.g. chapter 7 of Mind in Life). It is beyond the scope of the 
present treatment to develop any sort of response to Thompson’s concerns. So 
my twofold point here remains merely conditional. First, if the broadly 
representationalist picture I have sketched is right, then the basic structure of 
ecologically embedded representation that characterizes the genetic contribution 
to development is replicated at the cognitive level of the neural contribution to 
online action-generation. In my book, this is an example of deep continuity. To 
borrow Thompson’s words, it is a case in which life and mind share a set of basic 
organizational principles, and the organizational properties distinctive of mind 
are an enriched version of those fundamental to life. Secondly, if my broadly 
representationalist picture is right, then in line with the more plausible reading 
of deep continuity identified earlier, there is no reason to think of genes as in any 
way minded. The phenomenon of enrichment that the view encompasses 
involves a bottom-up process in which certain fundamental structures from 
nonminded life are evolutionarily and developmentally incorporated into the 
basic structures of minded life. In other words, according to the account of deep 
continuity I favour, enrichment takes us from life to mind, it does not operate 
within the domain of mind. This leads me to conclude that, at least in terms of 
such diachronic incorporation, life is in mind, but mind is not in life.     
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